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Introduction 
 
The brief I‟ve been asked to address is the value, from the children‟s rights 
perspective, of the EU intervention in the family law justice arena and in particular 
whether it improves upon the Hague system (by which is meant instruments 
concluded and “run” by the Hague Conference on Private International Law) for intra 
EU cases.  I‟ve added to that brief reference to the Council of Europe because that 
too is an international institution that has an important role in the development of 
children‟s rights within Europe. 
 
No doubt when the organiser of this conference approached me she had in mind, 
because of my particular expertise, the EU impact on international child abduction 
disputes. So I will begin with that topic and from that seek to draw out wider themes. 
 
Child Abduction 
 
During the 1970s both the Hague Conference and the Council of Europe each 
decided to draw up a Convention to deal with abduction and each instrument was 
concluded remarkably close in time, the European Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Decisions Concerning Custody of Children etc, being opened for 
signature on 20 May 1980, and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction being made available for signature on 25 October 1980.  
Although the European Convention was wider in scope than abduction (and is not 
dissimilar in structure to BIIR) it was an object lesson in the folly of unnecessary 
duplication of effort by two major international institutions in dealing with a common 
subject.1     
 
The European Convention initially attracted more ratifications but the Hague rapidly 
became the pre-eminent instrument for dealing with abduction.  There are currently 
81 Contracting States (compared with 37 to the European Convention) comprising 
pretty well the whole of Europe including all 27 EU Member States and significant 
swathes of the rest of the world – the outstanding absent bloc being the Islamic 
world. 
 
The Hague Abduction Convention of course predated the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and it may  have been drafted differently had it post-dated it.  At 
any rate suffice it to say while it is predicated upon the premise that children‟s 
interests are generally best served in cases of wrongful removal or retention by their 
prompt return to their State of habitual residence, an individual child‟s interests are 
not the paramount consideration in any particular return application.  This is seen as 
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a fundamental flaw by some2 who naturally point to Art 3 of the UN Convention which 
provides that in all actions concerning children the best interests of the child shall be 
the primary consideration.  This indeed has been tested in the courts e.g. in the 
Australian Family Court and the German Constitutional Court which both considered 
the Hague Convention to be compatible with the UN Convention.3  Indeed, it could be 
argued that the 1980 Convention gives legitimacy to the Hague since Art 11 entreats 
States „to take measures to combat the illicit transfer and non return of children 
abroad‟ while Art 35 entreats States to „take all appropriate national, bilateral and 
multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of children for any purpose or any 
form‟.  But perhaps the best riposte is that the limited exceptions to the obligation to 
make a return order (particularly those directed to the child under Arts 12(2) and 13) 
pay sufficient regard to the interests of any particular child particularly since the 
abduction court is not deciding the „merits‟ of any custody dispute but is in effect 
merely determining in which forum that dispute must be determined. 
 
Whatever the merits of this argument are in theory, the practicality is that throughout 
Europe the Hague Abduction Convention operates quite happily alongside the UN 
Convention. Moreover, having been augmented by the revised Brussels II Regulation 
(BIIR), the EU has also implicitly recognised its compatibility with the UN Convention. 
 
But how come the EU became involved in this area particularly as at the time of the 
conclusion of the 1980 and 1989 Conventions it had neither interest in, nor 
competence over, family law in general nor child law in particular?  Well to cut a long 
story short (and this is now well documented territory)4 after the Treaty of Amsterdam 
had brought judicial co-operation in civil matters squarely into the Community 
framework and the European Council‟s follow-up meeting in Tampere at which the 
so-called „Tampere Milestones‟ (including the notion that „enhanced mutual 
recognition of judicial decisions and judgments and the necessary approximation of 
legislation would facilitate co-operation between authorities and the judicial protection 
of individual rights‟) were set out, the way was open to convert what may have 
otherwise been a permanently dormant Convention5 (itself controversially grounded 
upon the Maastricht Treaty)6 into a Regulation, namely, Council Regulation (EC) No 
1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of Parental Responsibility for 
Children of Both Spouses – the so-called Brussels II.  This Regulation came into 
force on 1 March 2001 and at a stroke catapulted the EU into a front line international 
institutional player in family law reform.  However, this first taste of major7 EU family 
law was hardly encouraging.  For example, it provided multiple bases for taking 
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jurisdiction but provided no hierarchy choosing instead to solve the problem of 
clashing jurisdictions by giving absolute priority to the first jurisdiction seized.  That 
effectively encouraged a jurisdiction race which ran counter to modern family law 
thinking to encourage mediation.  So far as children were concerned it only applied to 
those of both parents involved in divorce proceedings and not, for example, to step-
children.  It had no application to children outside the context of matrimonial 
proceedings between spouses.8  In short, it could hardly be described as a beacon 
instrument of children‟s rights. 
 
In the face of these criticisms and taking advantage of a French proposal to amend 
the Regulation to improve cross border rights of access,9 the Commission came up 
with their own proposal to reform Brussels II in relation to children10, not least that the 
instrument should be extended to cover the recognition and enforcement of all 
decisions relating to parental responsibility.  New, child focused rules of jurisdiction, 
primarily based on the child‟s habitual residence, but also allowing for prorogation of 
jurisdiction and for transfers of jurisdiction respectively subject to or based on the 
child‟s best interests were also included in the proposal. 
 
All this was fine and a welcome improvement on the original Regulation but the 
stumbling block was the proposals concerning child abduction which effectively 
would have disapplied the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention.  Although rooted in 
the desire to create „even more ambitious rules on child abduction within the 
Community‟, and developed in the general context of devising common jurisdictional 
rules to hear children cases, the proposals split the Community.11  But just when all 
seemed lost for these non mandated proposals the Danes brokered a compromise 
whereby the Hague Abduction Convention would continue to apply to intra EU cases 
but where a return order was refused new rules (see Art 11(6) – (8)) effectively giving 
the child‟s home court the final say following a merits hearing were to be applied.  
This paved the way for the revised Regulation (variously described as Brussels IIA or 
II Bis, but hereafter referred to as „BIIR‟) to be finally concluded (Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003).  It came into force on 1 March 2005. 
 
In fact BIIR had a greater impact upon the Hague Abduction Convention than simply 
applying at the refusal stage.  Article 11(2) of the Regulation, for instance, directs the 
court when applying Arts 12 and 13 of the Hague Convention (effectively whenever a 
return order is being sought) to ensure that  
 
 „the child is given the opportunity to be heard during the proceedings unless 
this appears inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of 
maturity‟. 
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This indeed broke new ground for although one of the exceptions to the obligation to 
order a return under Art 13 is that „the child objects to being returned and has 
attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its 
views‟, the Convention makes no express provision for the child‟s voice to be heard 
in abduction proceedings.  In turn, Art 11(2) has had a significant impact on 
abduction proceedings before the English courts inasmuch as it is now established12 
that the question of how and whether the court will hear the child in discharge of its 
obligation under Art 11(2) should be considered at the first directions appointment 
and at any subsequent directions appointment to ensure that the essential ingredient 
of the obligation is never out of the spotlight.  In fact the English courts have changed 
their practice with respect to all abduction cases and not just those governed by 
BIIR.13 
 
Article 11(2) does not purport to dictate to national authorities how the child is heard 
(indeed Recital (19) expressly says that in this respect BIIR „is not intended to modify 
national procedures‟) but it has probably led to a greater readiness than previously to 
give children party status in Hague cases.14 
 
Another provision of Art 11 worth mentioning is Art 11(3) which imposes a time limit 
of six weeks in which („except where exceptional circumstances make this 
impossible‟) a court should issue its judgment from the time when the application is 
lodged.  This is a stronger enjoinder than anything to be found in the Hague 
Abduction Convention and is, undoubtedly, a child welfare/rights enhancing 
provision.  How effective this provision is across the Union is a matter of speculation 
but certainly England and Wales treats this obligation very seriously and there is 
evidence that in Germany, for example, court decisions have been considerably 
speeded up. 
 
Of course BIIR is not just concerned with return order applications in the context of 
child abduction.  Mention might also be made, for example, of the new access 
provisions which are based on the French proposal and which were the raison d‟être 
for revisiting the original Brussels II Regulation.  Indeed as the Practice Guide to BIIR 
puts it,15 one of the main objectives of the Regulation is to ensure that a child can 
maintain contact with all holders of parental responsibility after a separation even 
where they live in different Member States.  The principal innovation in this context is 
to provide for a fast track enforcement procedure whereby, provided an appropriate 
certificate has been issued by the judge that made the order, an access order is 
directly recognised and enforceable in another Member State.  In other words it is 
neither necessary to apply for „exequatur‟ (as enforcement order) nor is it possible to 
oppose recognition of the judgment. 
 
Although not beyond criticism, for example, it has been pointed out16 that „no 
progress has been made in improving the ability of courts to deal with an access 
order that is out of date, and no longer meets the needs of the child or the family‟, the 
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access provisions under BIIR provide some important improvements to safeguard 
what, after all, is a key child right as provided for by Art 9(3) of the UN Convention „to 
maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, 
except if it is contrary to the child‟s best interests‟. 
 
TAKING STOCK 
 
At this stage it is time to take stock.  What should be made of the EU‟s foray into 
mainstream family law in general and child law in particular at any rate in the context 
of the Brussels II Regulations 2001 and 2003?17  Certainly the EU is a potent force.  
McEleavy makes the point18 that „the evolution of the Brussels II initiative shows how 
a small grouping of States, in conjunction with the Commission are able to push an 
agenda and drag the other Member States along with them.  Even if the majority are 
not willing participants the practical reality of European politics means that Member 
States are unlikely to make a stand unless the issue in question is viewed as being of 
fundamental national importance or has significant financial consequences‟.  „Family 
law measures‟, he tellingly adds, „are unlikely to fall into either category‟.   
 
McEleavy was specifically commenting on the initial Brussels II but much the same 
comment could be made in respect of BIIR, though a significant battle was waged 
over the abduction provisions and compromises were made.  Time will tell whether 
the same comment will be true of the attempt to amend BIIR by the so-called Rome 
III proposals dealing with applicable law on divorce.19  Although these proposals 
seemed dead in the water following Sweden‟s formal veto20 (the UK and Ireland 
having previously indicated they would not have “opted-in”), up to 9 Member States 
may be going ahead anyway invoking what is known as the „enhanced co-operation 
procedure‟.21 
 
The fact that the original Brussels II has already been fundamentally amended and 
has been the subject of further proposals to amend it bears testimony to another of 
McEleavy‟s concerns that rather than adopting a measured approach to making 
further reform in the family law domain, in contemporary European law making, 
progress is seen simply in terms of the rapid implementation of the measures 
perceived to be necessary for the creation of an area of freedom, security and 
justice.  In short, McEleavy‟s charge is that the EU law making machine is like an 
unstoppable juggernaut. 
 
Although I think that States have recently shown themselves to be less willing to be 
rolled over even in respect of family law reform (witness the battle over child 
abduction in BIIR and the larger opposition to Rome III) there is more than a scintilla 
of truth in the McEleavy charge.  But is this necessarily a bad thing?  What are the 
plusses and minuses of the EU intervention to date and should further intervention be 
viewed positively or not? 
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The Plusses of EU Intervention 
 
Although the original Brussels II Regulation was far from an ideal family law 
instrument, BIIR is much better and does make important contributions to the 
development of children‟s rights within Europe.  One can point in particular to the 
provision in Art 11(2) for having to listen to children involved in Hague Abduction 
Convention proceedings22 and to Arts 40-41 for the automatic enforcement of access 
orders in cross border cases. Nor should the child focused rules of jurisdiction be 
overlooked.  Although whether these changes were formulated more for 
completeness rather than out of genuine concern for and commitment to children‟s 
rights can be debated,23 given their existence, the motivation does not really matter. 
 
One advantage of having EU based rights is that it is subject to the European Court 
of Justice in Luxembourg (ECJ) which, uniquely for family law instruments, can 
provide uniform interpretation across the Union.24  Furthermore the effectiveness of 
that Court has been immeasurably improved by the introduction in March 2008 of the 
„urgent preliminary ruling procedure‟ by which the reference process has both 
streamlined and considerably speeded up.25  In the first case determined under this 
procedure, Re Rinau26 – a case concerning the application of Art 11(6)-(8) of BIIR 
following a refusal to make a return order, the reference was made on 14 May 2008 
and judgment delivered on 14 July 2008.  However, this development is tempered by 
the fact that under BIIR only „final‟ courts can make a reference.27  Furthermore, there 
must be concern about the lack of a family law expert on the ECJ Bench.28 
 
Another advantage of the EU is that it has the muscle to push changes through – 
this, if you like, is the plus side of the juggernaut effect.  For example, I would 
consider that having to listen to children as provided for by Art 11(2) is an important 
improvement on the Hague Abduction Convention, but it is not one that could have 
been quickly delivered by the Hague Conference, if at all. 
 
The EU also has resources that will enable it to carry through reform and, therefore, 
will enable it to deliver, for example, on its Strategy on the Rights of the Child.29  That 
puts it at a distinct advantage both over the Hague Conference and the Council of 
Europe. 
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Finally, the Commission has not proved impervious to criticism or intransigent about 
its proposals – witness the experience of BIIR - and, arguably, though still barely 
pausing to take breath, has become more considered about its appropriate strategy 
for children‟s rights. 
 
The Minuses of EU Intervention 
 
Although it is understandable that, as an institution, the EU would wish to improve the 
position of its children and indeed sets great store by doing so (witness the comment 
by Tenreiro and Ekström30 that while the Hague Abduction Convention was in force 
in all Member States and „functions well, it was possible and indeed desirable to 
create even more ambitious rules on child abduction within the European 
Community‟), its intervention not only carries the risk of complicating existing 
international regulation but also comes at a price of removing Member States‟ 
individual competence to enter into future international arrangements in the same 
field.  As to the former, national courts have to apply different regimes under the 
Hague Abduction Convention according to whether they are dealing with another 
Member State (except Denmark) or a State outside the Union.  Complication too can 
be expected over the precise inter relationship between BIIR and the Hague 1996 
Convention. 
 
As to the latter, following the so-called ERTA case law,31 individual Member States 
cede to the Union their competence to ratify, accede to or amend other international 
instruments, be they Hague, European or United Nations, in areas dealt with by EU 
legislation.  In the context of the Brussels II Regulation there were two casualties of 
this rule arguably to the prejudice to children‟s rights namely the block on Member 
States‟ independent ratification of the 1996 Hague Protection of Children Convention 
and of the 2003 European Convention on Contact Concerning Children. 
 
Happily, as part of the compromise when revising the Brussels II Regulation, 
provision was made for EU wide ratification of the 1996 Convention.  Although this 
was further blocked by the UK-Spanish dispute over Gibraltar, that particular issue 
having eventually been solved in the context of this Convention,  the way has indeed 
been paved for EU wide ratification which, following an EU Council Meeting of June 
2008, is set for June 2010.32  The irony here is that having initially held up wider 
ratification, the EU resolution has probably meant that EU wide ratification will have 
been achieved earlier than would have been the case had each State been allowed 
to act unilaterally.  Time will tell what will happen regarding the European Contact 
Convention. 
 
Reference to the Hague and European instruments prompts the further question of 
whether EU intervention was necessary at all – at any rate in the context of the 
Brussels II instruments.  Arguably, the French and German differences over divorce 
could have been solved by their mutual ratification of the 1970 Hague Convention on 
the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations; it would have been preferable for 
the amendments to the 1980 Hague Abduction Convention to have been undertaken 
by the Hague conference so as to apply to all Hague Contracting States, and much 
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of the wider parts of the BIIR had already been achieved by the 1996 Hague 
Protection of Children Convention.33 
 
However, this is now all water under the bridge, as is the argument about the EU‟s 
competence to have done what it has (though its hitherto limited competence via Arts 
61(c), 65 and 67 possibly explains its hitherto somewhat haphazard intervention to 
date and perhaps its essentially primarily adult concerns – a criticism voiced inter alia 
by Stalford and Drywood34 – query whether the projected new provision particularly 
Art 3(5) TEU will give clearer legitimacy to the projected children‟s rights initiative?). 
 
THE FUTURE 
 
The more important issue is how one should proceed in the future.  Given its limited 
resources and current projected programme, I don‟t think much can be expected of 
new child rights initiatives from the Hague Conference. As McEleavy points out,35 the 
Hague Conference has very limited resources, both financially and in terms of 
personnel and any new initiative has to go through an arduous process and has to 
have the support of key Member States. That is a pity inasmuch as the Hague 
working methods and in particular its readiness to permit NGOs to be involved in the 
negotiating process are probably the best as compared with the EU36 and the Council 
of Europe.  In any event the Hague Conference‟s natural brief is concerned with 
private international law.  Having said that, one might expect Protocols to be added 
to the Hague Abduction Convention and serious consideration might well be given to 
the incorporation of Art 11 of BIIR.  The issue of individual Member State 
competence to sign up to new Protocols will remain but now that the Commission is a 
formal member of the Hague Conference there should be no insurmountable 
difficulties for the EU wide commitment to any such changes. 
 
The Council of Europe has in fact the clearest mandate of the three European based 
institutions to make changes to States‟ substantive laws inter alia to protect children‟s 
rights since by Art 1(a) of the Statute of Europe 1949 its aim is  
 
 „to achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of 
safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common 
heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress‟. 
 
It has a well established track record in concluding instruments to promote and 
safeguard children‟s rights, for example, by its 1996 Convention on the Exercise of 
Children‟s Rights, but which to date has only been ratified by 11 States, though 
signed by 13 others, its already mentioned 2003 Convention on Contact Concerning 
Children (ratified by 6 States and signed by 11 others), by its plethora of 
Recommendations37 not least of which are those on Parental Responsibilities (1984) 
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and on Violence in the Family (1985).  It too has an ambitious programme, namely its 
Building a Europe for and With Children – Towards a Strategy for 2009-2011.  It has 
recently revised its Convention on Adoption38 and is currently working on revision of 
its 1975 Convention on the Status of Children Born in Wedlock and its White Paper 
on Principles Concerning the Establishment and Legal Consequences of 
Parentage,39 having commissioned a fresh study into the rights and legal status of 
children being brought up in various forms of marital and non marital partnerships 
and cohabitation.40 
 
Its main drawback is that it has become overshadowed by the EU and States have 
been slow to commit themselves to its Conventions particularly the recent ones.41  
There is also a need for greater monitoring of its instruments, but that is also true of 
the EU. 
 
In my view it is important that the contributions to the development of children‟s rights 
played by all three of the European-based institutions is recognised, preserved, 
promoted and, above all, coordinated. Domestic violence is a good case in point. 
There are those42 who have been lobbying EU Institutions to implement a policy on 
corporal punishment with a view to having more consistent laws within EU Member 
States. Yet as Stalford and Drywood, surely rightly point out,43 while the EU may be 
„politically poised to forge greater exchange of good practice and policy between 
Member States‟, that is insufficient in itself to legitimize EU action in areas that have 
no grounding in any area of EU activity. They further point out that it is difficult to 
attach any persuasive added value to an EU anti-smacking campaign given the 
„prodigious international efforts‟ of the Council of Europe44 and the UN Committee on 
the Rights of the Child.45 
 
It is clear folly for the institutions to work against or ignorance of one another.  But 
this is less likely to happen now as each have developed a good working relationship 
with one another (though each will continue to have their own agenda) and the 
Community/Union as we have said is now a member of the Hague Conference and, 
for example, is expressly named as an international organisation capable of ratifying 
the Convention on Contact Concerning Children.46  So my answer to the basic 
question posed by the title of this presentation, is not to see the EU as a better 
alternative to the Hague Conference or the Council of Europe, but simply as one of 
the means, albeit an important one, by which children‟s rights can be promoted. Mind 
you, care will be needed (a) to manage the competence issue and (b) not to make 
international regulation too complicated. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
nevertheless addressed to all Member States (Conventions only bind those States that choose to ratify 
them) who are expected (if they do not already do so) to take steps as soon as possible (for example, 
when adopting new legislation) to comply the standards contained in the Recommendation. 
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